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INTRODUCTORY REMARKS:
THE BURDEN OF JUDICIAL BYPASS PROCEEDINGS
A NN SHALLECK

*

A young woman, a girl of sixteen, discovers she is pregnant. She
knows that she wants to have an abortion. She may want to continue
with her education. She might know that she is not ready to take on
the enormous responsibility of raising a child. She might be playing
an important role in supporting emotionally, or even financially, the
family into which she would bring a child. To add her own child to
that family constellation might seem overwhelming. She might not
want to have a life-long connection to the boy or young man who got
her pregnant. That relationship could be unsatisfactory or even
destructive. She might not want that person to be a father of her
child. She might want to raise a child with someone she loves. She
might be ashamed of or embarrassed about her sexual activity. She
might blame herself for the pregnancy. She might not want her
parents to know about the crisis she faces. She might not want to
*

Professor of Law, American University, Washington College of Law. A.B. 1971, Bryn
Mawr College; J.D. 1978, Harvard Law School. The materials in this symposium were created as
part of an integrated section for our first year students at the Washington College of Law.
Professor Andrew Popper conceptualized and coordinates the work of this section. Without his
leadership, vision, care and support, this symposium would not have been possible. He has
insured that innovative projects are a fundamental part of the work of the section. I would also
like to thank Maria Mirabell, Amber Asher, Brian Appel, and Lance Rothenberg, who worked
on assembling the materials and performing the roles in the class dramatizations. brought
enthusiasm, intelligence and hard work to the project, all of which made the program fun, as
well as rewarding.
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burden them. She might be afraid of one or both of them. I have
only begun to chronicle the reasons behind the young womans
feeling that she wants an abortion. Abortion counselors around the
country know these reasons and many more.
The set of materials in this issue of the Journal of Gender, Social
Policy, and the Law seeks to translate the legal doctrines regarding
parental notification and/or consent, judicial bypass, and undue
burden into a form that gives those abstract doctrinal formulations
meaning within the lives of the real people whose lives are affected by
the pronouncements of the Supreme Court.
The two-part
dramatization of Maggies efforts to obtain an abortion is designed to
provide law students, law professors, lawyers, judges, advocates, and
all people who work with young women a better understanding of
how Supreme Court law operates the arena of abortion access.
We have provided a transcript of how an interview and counseling
session might unfold between a young woman, Maggie, who is
seeking an abortion in a fictional state, and a lawyer, who has decided
to devote some of his time to providing legal help in this situation.
The interview was constructed from the many materials that have
been amassed by organizations that work with these young women on
a daily basis. It is not meant to be a  typical interview. The situation
of each young woman is different. The challenges each woman faces
vary. The procedures in each county and in each state have their own
individual quirks. Each young womans attitudes toward family,
friends, lovers, sexual partners, school, the future, work, children,
committed relationships, abortion, and multiple other factors affect
differently her approach to the decision about ending a pregnancy.
Each young woman brings unique capacities for dealing with the
dilemmas, conflicts, feelings, expectations, logistical barriers, and
attitudes that she encounters.
We have also provided a transcript of a fictionalized judicial bypass
hearing. These hearings are a critical component of Supreme Court
law regarding the burdens of parental notification. These hearings
provide the legal rationale for upholding as constitutional a state
statutory requirement of parental notification or consent. Since
parental notification or consent might be potentially harmful to or
impossible for a minor, a process is needed that enables a young
woman to exercise her constitutional right. Judicial bypass is the
process that saves parental notification and consent requirements
from constitutional defect. These judicial bypass proceedings are
confidential, so we have no actual transcripts on which to base the
dialogue. Rather, we relied on the accounts of those who have
attended these hearings and our understanding of how typical
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standards that govern these proceedings might be interpreted and
applied by a judge.
We have created just one situation; it is not meant to be a story of
extreme hardship. Maggie, however, faces real and compelling
problems. She has resources and support, although limited, to deal
with those problems. She has the strength and capacity to follow
from one step to another in the constitutionally-mandated judicial
bypass process. By portraying this individual in this situation, we
hope not just to convey the dynamics of this particular set of
circumstances, but to suggest the wide range of circumstances in
which the constitutional doctrines operate with varying effects.
Similarly, the hearing is not designed to portray an ideologically
polarized proceeding. The judge is not meant to be openly antiabortion or pro-abortion. The judge may bring many assumptions
and feelings that influence his approach to the hearing: underlying
attitudes toward abortion, child rearing, family, sexuality (including
the sexual behavior of young women and men), the behavior of
teenagers, parental responsibility for minors, gender, womens
education, participation in the working world, the financial
responsibility of mothers and fathers for the expenses of raising a
child, and many others. The judge appears to try to make sense of
and take seriously the legal standards that guide the proceeding. By
portraying the judge as taking this approach, we have attempted not
just to convey this particular situation, but also to suggest the ways
things might be different given the wide range of dynamics that
might occur in a courtroom where the constitutionally required
procedure assumes human form.
The commentaries that follow the two-part dramatization address
some of the legal background for and raise some of the broader
issues that are suggested by the interview and the hearing. Professor
Jamin Raskin, the author of the judicial bypass script and actor
portraying the judge when we presented the program at the
American University, Washington College of Law, provides insight
about what the legal standards governing judicial bypass actually
2
He highlights the
mean as a judge struggles to apply them.
seemingly inevitable contradictions that those standards produce,
absent an ideologically driven judge. How can a minor who is not
sufficiently mature to make a reasoned decision about having an
abortion be sufficiently mature to take on the enormously complex
task of parenthood? And how can it be in the best interest of a minor
2. Jamin B. Raskin, The Paradox of Judicial Bypass Proceedings, 10 A M. U.J. GENDER, SOC.
POLY & L. 281 (2002).
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who is not mature enough to make a decision about abortion to be
required to have a child and assume the responsibility of raising it?
In concluding that the current standard is  unnecessarily and
dangerously broad, Professor Raskin proposes an alternative
doctrinal formulation to be applied when a judge finds that the
maturity standard is not met: Is a  desired abortion . . . contraindicated because bringing the pregnancy to term is medically
3
necessary to protect her (the young womans) health or life? Any
other rationale for denying the abortion, Professor Raskin argues,
should be a violation of Caseys  undue burden standard. Professor
Raskin goes on to explore the parallel legal regime that would govern
if a state sought to require parental notification or consent if a minor
wanted to bring a pregnancy to term. He wonders if, under the twopronged test of maturity and best interest, a judge could find, first,
that a young woman was not mature enough to have and care for a
child and, second, that it was not in her best interest to bring the
pregnancy to term. In applying his analysis of the standard that
should govern the abortion decision of an insufficiently mature
minor to a similar young womans decision to have a child, he argues
that only the test of  medical necessity should prevail in either
situation. Although he finds it deeply troubling to deny either young
woman the right to her decision, he urges all to confront and address
the distressing parallels in these two situations. Finally, Professor
Raskin suggests the animating reason behind what he calls the
 bypass paradox. If, under the required legal tests, virtually all
requests must be granted, then the only purpose the hearings serve is
to shame and degrade young women for attempting to exercise their
constitutional right.
Jennifer Blasdell, a Staff Attorney at the National Abortion
Federation, catalogues the many harms that young women suffer
4
from parental involvement laws. By creating delay, the procedures
required to notify parents or obtain their consent or to go through
the judicial bypass process endanger a young womans health and
demand extraordinary effort at a time of crisis and vulnerability. The
procedures add additional expenses, which are in many situations
great burdens for young women with few resources and little access to
substantial sums of money. Rather than fostering communication
and support within a family, these laws can often make young women,
who cannot inform their parents of their pregnancy, feel even more
3. Id. at 282.
4. Jennifer Blasdell, Mother, May I?: Ramifications for Parental Involvement Laws for Minors
Seeking Abortions Services, 10 A M. U.J. GENDER, SOC. POLY & L. 287 (2002).
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alone as they must go through many more steps on their own.
Further, society, through these laws, clearly conveys the message to
these young women that they are taking an action that is wrong and
dangerous. All of these harms, singly or in combination, result in
many young women being discouraged or barred from obtaining an
abortion. In addition to creating harm, Ms. Blasdell argues that
judicial bypass procedures violate a young womans right to privacy
and interfere with her decisions about the most intimate and
substantial matters in her life. She identifies the many areas of
medical decision-making where minors are given far greater
autonomy and privacy than they have regarding abortions. While
Professor Raskin identifies the paradox of judicial bypass, Ms. Blasdell
demonstrates how it operates as a procedural escape hatch from the
otherwise unconstitutional burden of parental involvement.
The final commentator, Betsy Cavendish, the Vice President and
Legal Director and General Counsel of the National Abortion and
Reproductive Rights Action League, places parental involvement laws
and judicial bypass procedures in the context of larger legal and
5
political developments regarding abortion. Her account of the
political battles surrounding the development of Supreme Court
doctrine demonstrates how each aspect of constitutional law cannot
be viewed outside of the ideological and strategic maneuvering of the
forces advocating for and opposed to abortion. She also explains
how the changes in Supreme Court doctrine that culminated in
Casey6 created the space for legal strategies at the state level that
operate to make abortion less accessible and more difficult to obtain.
This space has permitted parental involvement and judicial bypass
laws to flourish as an instrument in the broader battle over abortion.
The dramatization of the judicial bypass process and the
commentaries that follow provide a way to bring together Supreme
Court doctrine, state law, judicial proceedings, political battles, and
the experiences of people affected by the operation of our legal
system. These commentaries provide an opportunity to explore not
just issues around abortion, but also the roles of lawyers, judges, state
legislatures, advocates, and the Supreme Court. Most importantly,
they put at the center of this inquiry the experiences of one person, a
young woman named Maggie, who must live within the parameters
that the law shapes for all in our society.

5. Elizabeth A. Cavendish, Casey Reflections, 10 A M. U.J. GENDER, SOC. POLY & L. 307
(2002).
6. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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